Du Châtelet, Wolff, and Leibniz on Divine Eternity

This essay explores Émilie Du Châtelet’s neglected understanding of divine eternity and its relation to the views of Christian Wolff and G.W. Leibniz. It is divided into four parts. The first part sets the stage by distinguishing three views on divine eternity: atemporal, sempiternal, and permanent. The second part highlights an apparent tension in Du Châtelet’s discussion of divine eternity in her Institutions de physique (1740), subsequently entitled Institutions physiques (1742). It argues that that tension points towards Du Châtelet’s acceptance of a permanent view of divine eternity. The third part argues that Wolff holds a position similar to Du Châtelet’s, that is, that Wolff also holds a permanent view of both essences and divine eternity. The fourth part argues that although Leibniz may have held a permanent view of divine eternity in his youth, by the time of his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, he appears to have shifted away from Du Châtelet and Wolff towards an atemporal view. The essay concludes by suggesting that while Du Châtelet’s views on divine eternity may indeed be considered Leibnizian insofar as she rejects Newton’s and Clarke’s sempiternalism, her overall position with respect to divine eternity is closer to the views of Wolff than to those of Leibniz himself.