Émilie Du Châtelet Against Spatial Metaphysics

How does Émilie Du Châtelet’s understanding of space relate to the dominant views of her day? It has been natural to assume that her understanding of space is driven by the contrast between Newton’s substantivalism and Leibniz’s relationism. In this paper, I argue that that frame is, in fact, problematic. A much older contrast lies at the heart of Du Châtelet’s understanding of space, a contrast that stands between the spaceless metaphysics of Descartes, the Scholastics, and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the spatial metaphysics of not only Newton, but also of Leibniz, Henry More, Pierre Gassendi, and the ancient atomists on the other hand. What Du Châtelet rejects is not exactly Newton’s view and what she embraces is not at all Leibniz’s view. At the end of the day, Du Châtelet’s views on space are much more closely related to the spaceless view accepted by Descartes than the spatial views of either Newton or Leibniz.