Arnaud Pelletier (Université libre de Bruxelles) "From the First Principles of Experience to the Invention of Empiricism"

Abstract: In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz overlooks Locke's admission of the capacity to know self-evident truths. Through this omission, he portrays Locke as claiming that all knowledge derives solely from sensible experience (even a priori propositions in mathematics). He thus invents the "empiricist position," understood as a genetic thesis about the origin of knowledge. In this paper, I want to explain what other (pre-empiricist) conceptions of experience led Leibniz to invent this empiricist position as a faire-valoir. An important point is that he did not regard sensible experience as an autonomous source of knowledge. Rather, he regarded it as a support for all thought. In particular, he considered it necessary for access to a priori knowledge. In addition to the first principles of reason, he recognized some first principles of experience as the foundation of knowledge. But he also admits that no proposition is completely pure to our understanding (even mathematical or metaphysical propositions). The often-overlooked distinction between access to knowledge and source of knowledge is central to this debate.